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Abstract. The process that allows one to get rewarded for returning a
container through reverse vending machines (RVM) involves people and
technology. In fact, it typically sees a set of human parties (e.g. cus-
tomers, cashiers) and technical parties (e.g, RVMs, databases, scanners)
to collaborate in order to enable effective recycling. In this paper, we ad-
vance a formal treatment of the Danish Deposit Return System (DRS).
We investigate the security of the ceremony that people are expected to
perform in the context of DRS using field observation and automated
reasoning tools. We give a particular focus to the security threats due
to people interacting with the technology behind DRS. The findings of
our investigation enable novel considerations of the ceremony weaknesses
and make it possible to delineate potential mitigations.
1 Introduction
The introduction of technology into everyday life is normally considered secure,
as are the companies providing such technology. Examples include automatic
bike rental systems, online food ordering services, or, as we discuss in this paper,
automatic deposit-return systems for cans and bottles, as they are commonly
used all over Denmark. However, it is difficult to state precisely what security of
such systems means and what it would imply. The reason is that socio-technical
systems have a completely different attack surface than purely social systems,
where interactions are human to human, or purely technical systems, where
the operational context is deemed irrelevant. This attack surface can be, if not
properly considered, a threat to confidentiality of private information, or in our
case, the financial soundness of transactions, and therefore to the reputation of
the company deploying the technology or its suppliers.
In this paper, we consider a ceremony as a technical system extended with
its human users [3] and demonstrate that an analysis of the processes defining
the ceremony can yield insights that protect the company’s assets, its brand
and its reputation. We study the different Danish bottle and can deposit return
system (DRS) deployed in Danish supermarket chains Kvickly, Coop, and Netto,
and analyse formally the security ceremonies that they require using automated
reasoning tools. All DRS under consideration use a paper-based voucher system,
generated by a reverse vending machine (RVM) and refunded by the cashier. In
our study, we focus on three simple security requirements (1) if a voucher was
cashed, then bottles of corresponding deposit value were indeed returned, (2) if
a voucher is redeemed for a value, then the voucher was printed on an eligible
RVM machine, and (3) a voucher cannot be used more than once.
The main contribution of this paper is that it is possible to reason about
security ceremonies of this kind, with field observation and formal tools, and
that interesting observations can be made about the security of Danish DRS.
The mechanised argument is carried out in Tamarin [10]. In order to define
an appropriate model, we reverse engineer the DRS technologies in use and the
accompanying processes, as we had no access to design documents, implemen-
tation or process definition details. From the knowledge gathered this way, we
devise different socio-technical security contexts, which we model through dif-
ferent behavioural actions of inattentive customers or neglectful employees. In
summary, the formal analysis approach makes the notion of DRS security more
precise: some DRS are reasonable secure with respect to our model, while others
are completely insecure. Some DRS could even be tricked into accepting coun-
terfeit vouchers of arbitrary value that could easily be generated on a thermal
printer at home.
Outline. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe our reverse
engineering activities resulting in a model of the security ceremony for different
Danish DRS. In Section 3 we detail the formal analysis including the different be-
havioural actions. Our model includes some technical but mostly rules modelling
humans. In Section 4, we assess results and describe our findings. In Section 5,
we discuss related work before we conclude in Section 6.
2 Modelling the Ceremony
In Denmark, the deposit return scheme is typically implemented by supermarket
chains through reverse vending machines (RVM). The customer experience is
similar, independent of the store. However, different supermarket chains use
different technology, and hence the technical protocol may vary although this is
transparent to the customer. For example, RVMs deployed in Kvickly and Coop
supermarkets are similar, but they produce different vouchers compared to the
RVMs deployed in Netto supermarkets.
Since there is hardly any information about the technology behind deposit
return systems available, besides a few patents, this work follows a reverse en-
gineering approach and reconstructs the technical aspects and the ceremony
of DRS. In particular, this work adopts the road map for reverse engineering
proposed by Mu¨ller et al. [11] and focuses on field observation as a primarily
investigative technique to gather information regarding the ceremony.
2.1 The Reverse Vending Machines
Reverse vending machines (RVM) are the main technological element in the
DRS, hence it is essential to gather as much information as possible regarding
the functioning of RVMs to build a correct ceremony. Most of the RVMs in
Denmark are built by Tomra, and their specifications available to the public in
the form of patents. This work considers three Tomra machine models: T-710,
T-820, and T9. Every machine is built into a wall, which has a room on the
other side which can be accessed through a locked door. An RVM can either
accept a single empty container at a time or a beverage crate. Each container
is validated on the basis of its weight, barcode, and size. In general, an RVM
accepts only glass containers that have a barcode. The sole exemption is the
traditional shape of the Danish beer bottle, which does not need to be equipped
with a barcode for being accepted. Cans, instead, are accepted with or without
barcode. However, the latter case entails no reward for the customer.
From a security perspective, Tomra has filed several patents for detecting
fraud attempts in reverse vending machines [12,17,7]. However, the effort is al-
most exclusively concentrated on making sure that the machine does not accept
invalid containers. Thus, we can assume that no RVM would accept an invalid
container. Such an assumption can be confirmed by our observations of the ma-
chines. In particular, we had access to look through one of the Tomra RVMs
while being emptied from its containers.
Fig. 1: An example of a voucher printed by a Tomra T-710 machine
In Denmark, RVMs are equipped with thermal printers that print paper
vouchers. A voucher attests the number of containers filled by the customer and
entails a reward to them. An example of a voucher is in Figure 1. A voucher
includes the following information
– The redemption value in Danish kroner
– A machine-readable serial number (SN1)
– The number of containers
– The model of the RVM
– A non-machine-readable serial number (SN2)
– Time and date of the printing of the voucher
2.2 The Machine-Readable Serial Number (SN1)
To the best of our knowledge, there is no document covering how the RVM gen-
erates the information included in the voucher, especially how the serial numbers
are generated. According to the patents filed by Tomra [6,16], the company has
implemented some security measures against presentation of home-made vouch-
ers. In particular, some RVMs implement voucher control by means of a commu-
nication from the RVM to a cloud-based service solution provided by Tomra [20].
Once the filling of the RVM is completed by the customer, the RVM generates
the voucher and sends both redemption value and SN1 to the Tomra servers.
When later the voucher is presented for rewarding, this is controlled against the
Tomra server, which authorises the payment to the customer. According to the
patents, other solutions that do not require constant communication with the
Tomra server may be implemented. For instance, the RVM can be set to com-
municate locally with a computer hosted at store premises, which periodically
updates the list of valid vouchers to the in point of sale stations.
Since no public specification of SN1 is available, we have derived it empirically
by analysing the vouchers printed by the different Tomra machines this work has
taken in consideration (i.e. T-710, T-820, T9) hosted in three different stores (i.e.
Kvickly, Coop, and Netto). Kvickly and Coop belong to the same supermarket
chain. In our case, the Kvickly store hosts three T-710 machines, the Coop store
hosts two T-820 machines, and the Netto store hosts one T9 machine.
Kvickly and Coop Stores. Several vouchers with different values were col-
lected at different times and dates. A sample of the batch of vouchers collected
at Kvickly from a T-710 is in Figure 2a. It can be seen that, independently from
date and time, SN1 is fixed when the RVM is filled with one container worth of
1.00 Kr. However, SN2 still slightly changes. This is because the three vouchers
in Figure 2a were printed by three different machines. This is confirmed by the
second batch of vouchers (see Figure 2b) obtained from the same store. The
second batch also reveals that SN1 slightly changes accordingly the value of the
containers filled in the RVM. The first nine digits are always fixed while the 10th
and the 13th digits change. It can be seen that the 10th digit represents the total
value of the voucher. It is also confirmed that the same approach is used at the
Coop supermarket as depicted in Figure 2c. Here the 2nd digit of the SN1 digits
changes because the voucher is printed in a different store. However, the rest of
the SN1 reflects the value of the containers.
Finally, in order to fully predict all the digits of the SN1, it is necessary to
understand how the last digit is generated. We found that the last digit SN113





Fig. 2: The four different batches of vouchers obtained from different Tomra
machines at Kvickly, Coop, and Netto. (a) the SN1 digits are fixed in each
voucher; (b) some of the SN1 digits reflect the value of the voucher; (c) only the
2nd digit differs among Kvickly and Coop stores; (d) the SN1 digits increment
by one unit at Netto
SN113 “ x´ y where
y “ SN1[1. . . 12] ¨ r1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3s ^ x “ rys s.t. x mod 10 “ 0
For example, the SN1 in Figure 1 can be computed as
y “ r2 3 3 9 9 0 0 0 0 4 0 0s ¨ r1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3s
“ 2` 9` 3` 27` 9` 0` 0` 0` 0` 12` 0` 0 “ 62.
x “ r62s “ 70
SN113 “ x´ y “ 70´ 62 “ 8.
Netto Stores. The T9 machine at Netto generates the SN1 in a different way.
It can be seen that the value of the voucher is not anymore reflected on any of
the SN1 digits. Instead, by analysing three vouchers printed in sequence by the
machine, we found that the SN1 is implemented as a counter that increments
by one unit every time a voucher is printed. Notably, the SN1 digits can be also
fully predicted at Netto stores since the last digit of the SN1 is still a check digit
from the EAN-13 standard.
Discussion. The analysis of the vouchers printed at Coop confirms that the
SN1 and all the other information printed in the vouchers can be fully predicted.
Since a voucher can be redeemed at any of the stores of the same supermarket
chain, we can rule out that barcodes are sent to the store’s local computer. Also,
since any two vouchers with the same value turn out to contain the same SN1,
it is unclear how the Tomra servers can prevent a fake voucher to be redeemed
provided that other vouchers with the same value where printed. We believe
that in this case there is no communication from the RVM and that the scanner
reads the value of the voucher from the SN1 only. However, as we shall see later,
we assume that such communication exists in the formal analysis of the Kvickly
and Coop DRS ceremony.
Netto stores have a different way to generate the SN1, and the value is not
stored in the SN1. Thus, we believe that the RVM should communicate to either
Tomra servers or a store’s local computer the details of the voucher. However,
as for Kvickly and Coop stores, the SN1 is still fully predictable, but in this case
one needs to know the value of the counter of the RVM.
2.3 Ceremony Description
Having seen the modelling of RVM and SN1, we can present a full description of
the ceremony, as depicted in Figure 3. It begins with the customer approaching
the RVM and inserting a number of containers (step 1). The RVM may either
accept or reject each of the containers. It will stop accepting new containers
when either the customer pushes the button to complete the filling phase or the
Fig. 3: The Danish deposit return system ceremony
RVM is full and cannot accept further items. Then, the RVM generates the data
to be printed in the voucher, and, optionally sends them to the Tomra servers
(step 2). The RVM prints the voucher (step 3) that can be redeemed at the cash
register at any of the stores belonging to the supermarket chain (step 4). There,
the cashier scans the barcode encoding the SN1 (step 5). As seen above, the
cash register may check the validity of the voucher against the Tomra server or
a local computer (step 6 and 7). Then, the cashier may either stamp the voucher
with the supermarket mark or rip it and put it in the cash register (step 7).
Finally, the cashier reads the import redeemable from the cash register (step 8)
and hands to the customer the money matching the value read from the cash
register (step 9).
3 Formal Analysis
We analyse the ceremony of the Danish DRS using an automated tool for the for-
mal verification of security protocols. Besides the modelling of the technological
part of the DRS ceremony, it is required to model behaviours of the people inter-
acting with the DRS. Thus, we model behavioural actions that people may per-
form as an extension of the canonical description of the ceremony. A behavioural
action may or may not be prescribed by the ceremony. In the latter case, they
may produce a deviation from the canonical description of the ceremony. For
example, the action in which a cashier throws away a voucher is a consistent
action with respect to the DRS ceremony and represents a possible deviation
from its canonical description. The goal of the analysis is to check whether such
deviations affect the security of the ceremony. Thus, three behavioural actions
are derived as follows
– the aware humans, in which no one deviates from the canonical description
of the ceremony;
– the inattentive customer, in which customers may share their vouchers with
other parties (possibly the attacker);
– the unaware cashier, in which the cashier may throw a voucher somewhere
else than the cash register.
The three behavioural actions outlined above are not meant to be compre-
hensive but includes what we think are the most basic ones for the DRS case.
They mainly serve to demonstrate the viability of analysis security ceremony
using a formal approach. Also, they enable one to assess whether the ceremony
is secure despite the deviations that originate from the actions.
The Tamarin Prover. Tamarin [10] is an interactive protocol verifier that
can prove reachability and equivalence-based properties in the symbolic model.
It has an expressive language based on multiset rewriting rules and comes with
a built-in attacker model (i.e. the Dolev-Yao attacker). However, it allows one
to specify any threat model. Each rule operates on a multiset of facts and has
a premise and a conclusion. Facts are predicates that store state information
and may be linear (i.e. can be consumed only once) or persistent (i.e. can be
consumed arbitrarily often by rules). The execution of the rules creates a labelled
transition system of the protocol in which all facts in the premise of a rule are
consumed by the facts in the conclusion.
3.1 Modelling Choices
Modelling a security ceremony into a symbolic model requires one to make some
abstraction choices. The first choice is to develop the equational theory needed to
model the ceremony. The equational theory allows one to model arbitrary cryp-
tographic and non-cryptographic functions. In the case of the DRS ceremony,
we model the following non-trivial functions
Table 1: Part of the equational theory to model the DRS ceremony in Tamarin
p˚Voucher scanning˚q getVoucherLeftpvoucherpSN1, valueqq “ SN1
p˚Voucher scanning˚q getVoucherRightpvoucherpSN1, valueqq “ value
p˚Cash out˚q getMoneypmoneypvalueq “ value
The function voucher captures the printing of a voucher by the RVM. The
function getVoucherLeft captures the scanning of the voucher and returns the
SN1. Similarly, the function getVoucherRight gets in the voucher and returns the
value of the voucher. Finally, the function getMoney models the cashier handing
to the customer the amount of money matching the value read from the cash
register.
Another modelling choice regards the modelling of physical objects such as
vouchers or money. The presence and the handing over of physical objects are
typical of ceremonies since they involve people. However, physical objects are
normally not modelled in security protocols as these involve only the exchange
of pieces of information. The main difference between objects and pieces of infor-
mation is that the former cannot be reproduced and once they are handed over,
they are not anymore available to the sender. Conversely, a piece of information
can be replicated, stored, and made available to the sender. In Tamarin, hand-
ing and getting an object can be elegantly modelled using linear facts, in which
resources are expandable. The sending and the receiving of pieces of information
are modelled using persistent facts.
Another important choice regards the modelling of SN1 barcodes. We have
seen that in Kvickly and Coop stores the SN1 is a function of the number of
containers filled into the RVM. Hence, we model the SN1 barcode accordingly.
For simplicity, we assume the number of containers to be constant. This is not
the case for Netto stores, in which the SN1 barcode is a function of the previous
barcode. Here, we model the SN1 as a random value, otherwise the verification in
Tamarin may incur into non-termination. Note that this is a securely sound over-
approximation of the model since, as we have seen before, the SN1 is predictable
provided one knows the previous barcode printed by the RVM. However, we
assume that the attacker has no access to such barcode (but he may have access
to other barcodes). This assumption is sound since any attack found in such a
scenario would be valid also in the scenario where the barcode can be predicted.
3.2 Human Rules
Behavioural actions can be easily modelled in Tamarin as rules. For reason of
space, we comment only on the main rules of the ceremony that model be-
havioural actions1. The rule that expresses a customer receiving a voucher from
the RVM (i.e. step 3 of the ceremony) and handing it to the cashier (i.e. step 4





This rule is part of the canonical description of the ceremony, hence it con-
tributes to the modelling of the aware humans. In the premise, the fact AgSt ex-
presses a customer H1 who knows how many containers have been filled conts I
and receives the voucher O. In the conclusion, the customer hands the voucher
to the cashier H2 but memorises how many containers have been filled out. The
suffixes I and O stand for information and object respectively. Information
1 The full Tamarin code is available at the link https://www.dropbox.com/s/
qrinq3yc9kkrq4e/DRS_Tamarin.zip?dl=0
facts are kept on conclusions while object facts are not. Handing is captured by
channels In O and Out O, which are modelled as linear facts.
The rules concerning the inattentive customer can be summarised as
rule H1SendToBadH:





[AgSt($H2,’H2_0’, validation_I), In(<voucher_O, $Badh>)]
--[H2GetFromH1($H2, voucher_O, validation_I)]->
[AgSt($H2, ’H2_1’, <voucher_O, validation_I>),
Out_O($H2, $Re, ’voucher_H2ToRe’,voucher_O)]
The rule H1SentToBadH is similar to the canonical rule seen above for the
aware humans, but with a different conclusion, in which the customer hands the
voucher to the attacker. In this case, only H1 appears in the fact Out since the
recipient is the attacker. Similarly, the rule H2GetFromBadH enables the cashier
to get a voucher from any one, including the attacker. These rules deviate thus
extend the canonical description of the DRS ceremony.
The unaware cashier can be captured with a rule that specifies another devia-





,In_O($Re, $H2, ’money_ReToH2’, money_O)]
--[H2SendToH1($H2, voucher_O, validation_I, verification_I,
money_O, value_I),
Eq(validation_I, verification_I)]->
[Out_O($H2, $H1, ’money_H2ToH1’, money_O),
Out(<voucher_O, verification_I>)]
In the premise of the rule, the cashier H2 receives a signal from the cash
register Re about the validity verification I of the voucher (step 6). In the
conclusion, the cashier hands the money to the customer (step 9) and throws
away the voucher, which becomes available to the attacker.
4 Findings
We analyse the DRS ceremony against three security requirements
– Cash for container, which says that if a voucher is redeemed for a value,
then some containers of equal value should have been returned earlier.
– Cash for voucher, which says that if a voucher is redeemed for a value, then
a voucher was actually printed by an RVM.
– Unique voucher, which says that a voucher can be used only once to get
money.
The three requirements above capture what we believe are the basic security
properties for a DRS. They can be modelled in Tamarin using first-order logic.
The requirement of cash for container can be modelled as
lemma CashForContainer:
"( All H1 value_I conts_I #k. H1GetFromH2(H1, value_I, conts_I)@k ==>
(Ex conts_O conts_I #j. H1SendToV(H1, conts_O, conts_I)@j & j<k))
"
where H1GetFromH2 and H1SendToV are labels for the rules that capture respec-
tively step 9 and step 1 of the ceremony.
Similarly, the requirement of cash for voucher is captured by the following
lemma
lemma CashForVoucher:
"( All H1 value_I conts_I #i. H1GetFromH2(H1, value_I, conts_I) @i ==>
(Ex H2 SN1_I voucher_O #j.
VSendToH1(H2, SN1_I, value_I,conts(conts_I), voucher_O) @ j & j<i))
"
The label VSendToH1 corresponds to the rule in which the RVM prints the
voucher (step 3).
Finally, the requirement of unique voucher can be modelled as
lemma UniqueVoucher:
"( All H2 voucher valid1 valid2 money value H2_2
valid1_2 valid2_2 money_2 value_2 #i #j.
H2SendToH1(H2, voucher, valid1, valid2, money, value)@i &
H2SendToH1(H2_2, voucher, valid1_2, valid2_2, money_2, value_2)@j ==>
#i=#j)
"
The label H2SendToH1 captures the step in which the cashier hands the money
to the customer (step 9). The terms valid1 and valid2 refer respectively to
the successful validation signal that the cashier receives from the register and
to the verification message that the server sends to the register. There is also
a difference between money intended as coins and banknotes, and the piece of
information regarding their value. Note that all the parameters of the two labels
but voucher are different. The temporal marks i and j are crucial: if step 9 is
executed twice with the same voucher, it should be referring to the same action,
that is, all the parameters have indeed the same values.
In Table 2 are the results obtained by checking the ceremonies in Tamarin.
Concerning the ceremonies at Kvickly and Coop stores, the tool proves that the
ceremony with aware humans meets cash for container and cash for voucher.
The requirement of unique voucher is not met because two different RVMs print
the same SN1 barcode as this depends on the number of containers filled by
the customer. Tamarin finds attacks for all three properties when inattentive
Table 2: The result of the ceremony analysis of the Danish DRS
Kvickly & Coop Netto
Aware Inattentive Unaware Aware Inattentive Unaware
Cash for container 3 7 3 3 7 3
Cash for voucher 3 7 7 3 7 3
Unique voucher 7 7 7 3 3 3
customer actions are considered as part of the ceremony. We found that the
common issue that leads to falsify the properties is that the attacker may create
fake vouchers based on what he has seen earlier. Namely, the attacker can create
vouchers that were never printed by any RVM. This is also possible because the
attacker knows that the SN1 only depends on the number of containers. For the
same reason, the ceremonies at Kvickly and Coop stores fail at ensuring cash for
voucher when actions from unaware cashier are considered: the Tamarin trace
shows that the attacker can just hand the voucher to the cashier a second time if
the latter does not destroy it properly. Notably, the attack is possible even if the
vouchers are synced and controlled through the Tomra servers, as the voucher
is based solely on the number of containers filled in by customers. It is enough
that a number of customers have filled in the same number of container, for the
Tomra servers have multiple vouchers with the same SN1.
The DRS ceremony for the Netto stores meets all the requirements when
aware humans are considered. However, if one considers an inattentive customer,
cash for container and cash for voucher cannot be ensured. This is because the
attacker, once he knows the SN1, can print the voucher on its own and be
refunded in place of the legitimate customer. However, both cash for container
and cash for voucher are met for unaware cashier since the SN1 are uniquely
generated and, once they are redeemed, the Tomra servers remove the SN1 from
the list of valid barcodes, making it impossible for an attacker to redeem the
corresponding vouchers again. The requirement of unique voucher is met in all
scenarios. However, Tamarin cannot prove unique voucher for unaware cashier if
the Tomra server sends only an acknowledgement about the validity of a specific
voucher. We found that it is required that the server explicitly sends back the
valid SN1 to the cash register, and the latter checks the correctness of this against
the scanned voucher.
4.1 Discussion
Having analysed formally the ceremonies for the Danish DRS, we can conclude
that, according to our model, the Kvickly and Coop ceremony is less secure
than the one in Netto stores. The main problem with that ceremony is that
one can generate a voucher by guessing the number of containers that other
customers may have previously filled into any of the RVMs that belong to the
supermarket chain. This is worsened by the fact that vouchers have the same SN1
independently from which RVM they have been generated, hence an attacker can
likely be successful on redeeming a fake voucher holding the same SN1.
The Netto ceremony sees the RVMs generating the SN1 based on an internal
counter. Thus, each voucher is unique and is validated against a check with the
Tomra servers. The Netto ceremony is secure in all scenarios but inattentive
customers. However, we analysed the ceremony assuming that the attacker has
no access to the internal counter of an RVM. Hence, the Netto ceremony is po-
tentially vulnerable if one knows the current counter of an RVM. We believe that
such potential vulnerability can be easily removed by using digital signatures,
which would make the vouchers not predictable any more. The presence of digital
signatures in paper ticketing has been already developed in public transporta-
tion. The signatures are generated by the public transportation server, encoded
as QR codes, and then scanned by the ticket inspectors who hold portable scan-
ners that store the verification key [4]. The Danish deposit return system can
be modelled in a similar way. The voucher can be signed by the RVM, while the
cash register can store the verification key. Since the digital signature of an SN1
cannot be forged, vouchers cannot be fully predicted by the attacker unless he
knows the signing key. We modelled the Netto ceremony with digital signatures
in Tamarin and the outcome of our analysis confirms that the ceremony would
meet at least the same level of security of the original Netto ceremony. How-
ever, in the case of inattentive customers, an attacker can still make a copy of a
voucher and redeem them in place of the customer. We believe that this attack
cannot be avoided unless the customer is actively involved in the generation and
validation of the voucher, for example using a PIN.
5 Related Work
Formal approaches for the analysis of socio-technical systems have been recently
proposed in a few works. Basin et al. [1] formalised models of humans in security
protocols and analysed two-factor authentication protocols in Tamarin as case
studies. They considered three main human models. The first is the infallible
human model, in which the human actions follow the prescribed steps of the
protocol. In this paper, it corresponds to the aware humans. The second model
is the untrained human, in which the human actions are completely controlled
by the Dolev-Yao attacker. The last model is the rule-based human, which is
defined as the untrained human with specific restricting rules that limit the
arbitrary behaviour of the Dolev-Yao attacker. Conversely, this paper models
the inattentive customer and unaware cashier actions as rules that extend the
canonical description of the ceremony.
Johansen and Jo¨sang [5] discussed probabilistic models of humans, while
Probst et al. [14] proposed novel formal approaches to analysing socio-technical
systems. Bella and Coles-Kemp [2] provided a model for the analysis of security
ceremonies termed the ceremony concertina and demonstrated it by formally
analysing the Amazon user registration ceremony using the Inductive Approach
[13]. Giustolisi et al. [15] analysed the TLS certificate validation in different
browsers in front of socio-technical properties using UML and model checking
tools. Stojkovski et al. [18] recently proposed a model to define socio-technical
misalignments between a technical system and its users, and formally verified
an end-to-end email encryption system against a set of misalignment proper-
ties. Differently from the works outlined above, which consider a single human
role, this paper provides a formal account on human-to-human interactions as it
considers a ceremony with customers and cashiers.
Martina et al. [9] and more recently Martimiano and Martina [8] proposed
a shift from the classical Dolev-Yao attacker model to a more dynamic and
human-centred threat model. In this paper, we still rely on the Tamarin built-in
Dolev-Yao attacker, although we believe that the analysis of our case study into
a different threat model may be beneficial to gain even more accurate and deep
understanding of the security of the ceremony.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the socio-technical analysis of a security ceremony
can be pivoted on field observation and formal verification tools. Field observa-
tion enables the reverse engineering of ceremonies, as they usually lack proper
documentation. Thus, field observation produces a specification that can be fed
into a formal verification tool. The latter provides a precise way to dissect the
security implications of the ceremony and allows one to formulate and verify
potential mitigations.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper has provided the first security anal-
ysis of a DRS considering its human players. Although DRS is a well-established
technology in Denmark and other countries in the world, it has been found that
RVM manufactures devote most of their efforts to the detection of fake con-
tainers rather than detecting the refunding of fake vouchers. This work has also
found that minor changes in the technology behind DRS may lead to severe
security implications, although the technology comes from the same manufac-
turer and human interactions are identical. Fixing the technology to cope with
the behavioural actions that people may perform outside the box is yet an open
problem. Other countries adopt a voucher-less scheme in which customers are
provided with personal cards. Customers use their cards to collect points that
can be redeemed for rewards. While personal cards may mitigate threats due to
inattentive customers, they pose novel privacy threats by exposing customers’
habits in purchasing cans and bottles. We are not aware whether the findings
of this work are applicable to other manufacturers and countries. We have con-
tacted both Dansk Retursystem and Tomra on the issue and, at the time of
writing this paper, we are waiting for a reply.
This work aims at contributing to the establishment of holistic approaches to
security. Future work should focus on how systematically model out-of-the-box
human interactions into behavioural actions that can be fed into a formal verifi-
cation tool. A desirable feature of such a model is to make it independent from
the specific ceremony so that it would be possible to build a formal framework
for the analysis of less restricted security ceremony. As regards the analysis of
DRS, we believe that it would be interesting to investigate other scenarios such
as the one with additional behavioural actions as well as analysing the impli-
cations of scenarios with multiple behavioural actions from different people at
the same time. However, the Dolev-Yao attacker may be too powerful to appre-
ciate the subtleties entailed by such scenarios, hence we think that a different
threat model than the Dolev-Yao attacker should be considered. Finally, it would
be interesting to analyse recent voucher-less and fully digital DRS proposals in
which customers receive their refunds using an app [19]. The more pervasive the
technology becomes, the more socio-technical analysis is required.
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